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THE EVOLUTION OF A SUITABILITY STANDARD
IN THE MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY:
THE SUBPRIME MELTDOWN FUELS THE FIRES
OF CHANGE
FRANK A. HIRSCH, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION

The subprime mortgage meltdown that began in 2007,
accompanied by a huge spike in delinquencies and foreclosures on
mortgage loans, has caused intense focus on possible ways to
prevent the reoccurrence of imprudent lending and high-risk loan
products when sold to credit challenged consumers. Suitability is a
concept recognized in the securities law that imposes a duty on a
securities broker to sell only securities to a buyer that are
"suitable" for the buyer based on the buyer's financial
wherewithal, tax status, investment objectives, and other factors.
Suitability of a mortgage product for a particular borrower is not
yet a recognized legal standard with agreed upon characteristics.
The notion of developing a suitability standard in the mortgage
industry, however, is under serious scrutiny as the operation of the
mortgage industry from 2000 to 2006 is being closely examined by
executive branch leaders, legislatures, regulators, industry
representatives, and consumer advocates.
In the mortgage lending context, suitability refers to the
appropriateness of a mortgage loan's terms for the borrower's
specific situation. This sounds like a benign concept, but the
imposition of a suitability standard is historically contrary to
established legal rules applicable to the borrower-lender
* The author is the co-chair of the Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice
group in the Raleigh office of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough LLP. A former
general counsel for Centura Banks, Inc., RBC Centura, he regularly defends financial
institutions in consumer finance cases. The author wishes to thank and acknowledge
Anitra Goodman and Farah Lisa Whitley-Sebti for their assistance with this article.
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relationship, as well as to the role of the mortgage broker in the
origination and underwriting process for mortgage loans.
Moreover, the suitability standard is at odds with other
requirements imposed on lenders to ensure not only equal access
to credit, but that the credit needs of low income customers are
also met. Nonetheless, the mortgage crisis in 2007 that has
continued into 2008 will force a showdown over suitability
principles that may alter the legal landscape.
Part I of this article discusses the traditional legal treatment
of suitability principles in the mortgage lending context and traces
the evolution of the concept in the securities industry. Part II sets
forth the arguments by consumer advocates and the counterarguments by lending industry leaders regarding the application of
a suitability standard to the mortgage industry. Part III of the
article chronicles recent state and proposed federal legislative
approaches that address the concept of suitability for mortgage
lending, as well as the position of the federal regulatory agencies
which oversee financial institutions. Part IV discusses several
recently filed lawsuits that attempt to advance the concept of an
unsuitable mortgage. Finally, Part V cautions that imposition of a
suitability standard would likely result in the unintended
consequence of reducing credit to minorities and increasing the
cost of credit generally.
II. TRADITIONAL

LEGAL TREATMENT OF SUITABILITY CLAIMS

The relationship of lenders and borrowers is typically
viewed as an arms-length transaction where each side looks to
advance its own interests. The creditor-borrower relationship is
generally not a fiduciary one requiring lenders to guard the
interests of the borrowers. For that reason, the concept of
suitability has little current support in the case law on mortgage
lending.' Historically, absent special mitigating circumstances,
1. In the loan underwriting process, lenders generally have no duty to refrain
from making a loan if they arguably should know that the borrower cannot repay the
loan. See Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 676-79 (Ala.
2001); Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); N. Trust Co. v.
VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); United Jersey Bank
v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 46-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); DeBry v. Valley
Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Utah 1992).
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lenders do not even owe borrowers the duty of care to avoid
negligence in the lending process, although some regulators take a
contrary position based upon their primary goal to ensure safety
and soundness to the banking system.2 Indeed, lenders do not owe
a duty to borrowers to ensure accurate appraisals of the value of
the real estate as collateral; instead, loan applicants should make
their own determination of value.3 Similarly, a lender need not
require or pay for a property inspection, and if one is obtained, the
lender is free to condition loan approval on certain repairs being
made, but has no duty to disclose all adverse conditions noted or
to require all cited items to be repaired.4
In the context of the propriety of the borrower's decision to
sign the loan and the economic merits of the borrower's financial
situation, the lender has no judicially imposed duty to ensure
ability to repay the loan,5 although most lenders, prior to the
recent increase in subprime mortgages, were unwilling to make a
loan in which they doubted the borrower's ability to repay. Other
than the applicable state and federal laws which mandate certain
disclosures under specified conditions, there is generally no duty
placed on lenders to tell borrowers the effect of a financing
transaction on the borrower's overall financial situation.6 A
mortgage loan is acknowledged to be a business transaction where
each party seeks its own economic interest, rather than a
relationship of trust and confidence.
Strong public policies
2. See, e.g., In re Fremont Inv. & Loan, FDIC-07-035b, FDIC Enforcement
Decisions and Orders 9 (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforce
ment/2007-03-00.pdf (requiring Fremont to stop making loans without assessment of
the borrower's ability to repay at the fully-indexed rate).
3. See Dubinsky v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 708 A.2d 226, 229-30 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1998); Block v. Lake Mortgage Co., 601 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
Fuller v. Banknorth Mortgage Co., 788 A.2d 14, 17 (Vt. 2001).
4. See Bradley v. Prange, 897 So. 2d 717, 720 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Guimmo v.
Albarado, 739 So. 2d 973, 975-76 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Fuller,788 A.2d at 17.
5. See Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank, 284 Cal. Rptr. 367, 377 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 283 Cal. Rptr. 53, 56-57 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); Wagner, 161 Cal Rptr. at 521; N. Trust, 657 N.E.2d at 1102.
6. Gonzales v. Assocs. Fin. Serv. Co. of Kan., 967 P.2d 312, 325 (Kan. 1998).
7. See Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 347-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); Lawrence v. Bank of Am., 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); First
Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. 1984); Dennison State Bank v.
Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (Kan. 1982); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wash. 1982).
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support a solvent financial system and low barriers to home
ownership and these policies militate against exposing mortgage
lenders to fiduciary duties and litigation risks. 8
The exceptions to these general rules include fact patterns
where lenders routinely provide extra advice or services as
business advisors, 9 fail to separate their banking and investment
services,' ° or otherwise have specific knowledge that the applicant
is placing trust and confidence in the lender to look out for the
borrower's best interests." If a lender exerts control over a
borrower, or actively participates beyond the normal protection of
its security interest in the loan collateral, then the lender could
face potential duties not normally present 2 If the borrower lacks
access to information, is unsophisticated, has specific known
infirmities, or some other unusual status, then the normal rules
may not apply. 3 In some jurisdictions, lenders have been subjected to claims of negligent misrepresentation or civil conspiracy
for ordering appraisals or prescribing approved appraiser lists
resulting in inaccurate appraised value of the collateral in the
transaction. 4
Prior to the current subprime mortgage meltdown, the only
recognition of a suitability standard in the mortgage industry came
from statutory imposition. The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) amended the Truth in Lending Act to
include, for certain high-cost or Section 32 loans, the requirement
that the lender must consider the borrower's ability to repay and
not just look to the value of the collateral. 5 Similarly, for HOEPA
loans, any16 refinancing within one year must be "in the borrower's
interest.'
8. See Fox & Carskadon Fin. Corp. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.,
125 Cal. Rptr. 549, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
9. See Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
10. See Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1073, 1078-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
11. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1972).
12. See Cara Corp. v. Cont'l Bank (In re Cara Corp.), 148 B.R. 760, 773 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1992).
13. See Paulson v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482,490 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
14. See Larson v. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Des Moines., 300 N.W.2d
281, 287 (Iowa 1981); Costa v. Neiman, 366 N.W.2d 896, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
15. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4) (2007).
16. See id. § 226.34(a)(3).
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Starting with North Carolina in 1999, various state
predatory lending statutes codified a requirement that certain
loans must provide a "tangible net benefit"' 7 to the borrower,
imposing a suitability variation on some mortgage transactions.
As of 2007, anti-predatory lending statutes have been passed in
over thirty different states and regulations in at least seventeen
municipalities." These jurisdictions, following the lead of North
Carolina, incorporate various suitability-type tests. The proliferation of variant state and municipal regulatory regimes has led
many mortgage industry proponents to ask for a single, unified,
federal standard - but not one which includes a suitability test.
III. CONSUMER ADVOCATES' AND INDUSTRY ADVOCATES'
POSITIONS ON SUITABILITY

A.

Consumer Advocate Positions

Proponents of a suitability standard applicable to the
mortgage lending industry point to the fiduciary duties of brokers
in the securities industry and argue that this should be the model
adopted for the mortgage lending industry.' 9 Consumer advocates
argue that the existing protections are insufficient because there is
information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower
concerning mortgage products. They also note that the existing
system of protections was not sufficient to deter the subprime
mortgage meltdown.
Various forms of suitability protection are advanced by
consumer advocates: a fiduciary duty imposed on lenders and
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (2007).
18. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, MBA
SUITABILITY

-

DON'T

TURN

BACK

THE

POLICY PAPER SERIES 2007-1,
CLOCK ON FAIR LENDING AND

GAINS 11 (2007), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/News/
InternalResource/48134_Suitability-DontTurnBacktheClockonFairLendingandHo
meownershipGains.pdf; see also National Conference of State Legislatures,
Predatory Mortgage Lending, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/predlendintro
.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
19. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337-39 (2006);
see also Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the
Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10WTR J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEv. L. 117, 125-27 (2001).
HOMEOWNERSHIP
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brokers, rigid underwriting tests, some degree of subjective
evaluation by a lender of whether the loan product being sold is
best for that borrower, and a private right of action to sue for
violations. Professors Engel and McCoy also suggest that a
regulator be empowered to specify the parameters of a suitability
test.20 When determining a borrower's ability to repay a loan,
some consumer advocates 21 prescribe an underwriting test to deny
loans as unaffordable based upon a total debt to income (DTI)
ratio of between forty-five to fifty percent. Some suggest that the
DTI test should only be a rebuttable presumption. Others argue
that all adjustable rate mortgages must be underwritten from the
beginning at the fully-indexed rate after considering all associated
costs for the loan including escrows for homeowner's insurance,
taxes, private mortgage insurance, and additional fees or costs.
The suitability obligation for securities brokers who are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 22 has
been interpreted to apply only to broker recommendations, not to
an order for self-directed trading, and imposes two main
obligations.2 3 The first level of suitability focuses on the investment product rather than on the customer; brokers must
reasonably conclude the securities they recommend are suitable
for at least some investors. The second obligation relates to
customer-specific suitability. The broker must ascertain whether

20. See Engle & McCoy, supra note 19, at 1341-42.

21. See, e.g., Center for Responsible Lending, www.responsiblelending.org (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008); Consumer Federation of America, www.consumerfed.org (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008); National Consumer Law Center, www.consumerlaw.org (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008).
22. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) I 2310(a), IM 23102 (requiring that a NASD member "have reasonable grounds for believing that [a]
recommendation is suitable" for a customer, based on available facts, including facts
about the customer's other securities holdings and his or her financial situation and
needs - as well as make reasonable efforts, before executing a recommended

transaction, to obtain information about, "1) the customer's financial status; (2) the
customer's tax status; (3) the customer's investment objectives; and (4) such other
information used or considered to be reasonable ...

in making recommendations to

the customer").
23. The "know your customer" rule of the New York Stock Exchange is also
cited to justify the need to treat mortgage borrowers fairly and to treat each
individually with respect to their largest investment asset - their home. See N.Y.S.E.
Rule 405, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2405.
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the security is suitable for the particular investor based upon the
investor's financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and
other reasonable factors.
B.

The Mortgage Industry's Position

In general, industry advocates including trade associations
such as the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA),24 the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB),25 and the American
Financial Services Association (AFSA) 6 either oppose a suitability
standard, or argue that if some standard is developed, then it must
be clear and objective in nature, adopted as a federal standard, and
should not provide for a private right of action. The MBA
advances several justifications for opposing a suitability standard.
First, the MBA argues that even objective underwriting standards,
such as a DTI ceiling of forty-five percent, may result in the denial
of credit when other underwriting factors might justify a loan such
as potential earning capacity in a loan to a medical student or a law
.
clerk 27
Second, the MBA argues that suitability tests conflict with
other public policy duties placed on lenders to promote fair access
to credit, community reinvestment, and increases in homeownership.28 If applying suitability tests to mortgage transactions
causes credit denial rates to increase, which will be reported
annually in Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reports,2 9
then lenders will be potentially accused of violating some other
24. See MORTGAGE BANKERS Ass'N, supra note 18, at 19-23; see also Letter from
Wright H. Andrews, Wash. Counsel, Nat'l Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n, to Jennifer
J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Res. System 10-11 (June 7, 2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/June/20060613/OP-1253/OP-1253__1
.pdf. The MBA merged with the National Home Equity Mortgage Association
(NHEMA) in October 2006.
25. See Mortgage Bankers Association, www.mortgagebankers.org (last visited
Jan 29, 2008); National Association of Mortgage Brokers, www.namb.org (last visited
Jan. 29, 2008).
26. See American Financial Services Association, www.AFSA.org (including 350
member organizations operating as mortgage lenders, consumer finance companies,
auto finance leasing companies, credit card issuers, and industrial banks).
27. MORTGAGE BANKERS Ass'N, supra note 18, at 19.
28. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 18, at 20. See id. at 20.
29. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2000); see also
Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. § 203 (2007).
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federal statutes such as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), ° the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),31 or the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA),32 all of which carry significant class
action and reputational risks.
Third, the MBA argues that an uncertain new suitability
standard will limit borrower choices, and raise the costs of
mortgages based on the increased liability exposure to lenders.33 If
borrowers may argue lack of suitability as a defense to
foreclosures, then a lender's ability to realize on its security
interest will be impaired, 34 and lenders will accordingly charge
higher interest rates on mortgage loans.
Fourth, the MBA contends that the primary reasons for
defaults on mortgage loans are not loan product choices, but
rather family or economic challenges such as unemployment or
loss of income (41.5%), illness or death in the family (22.8%),
3
excessive obligations (10.4%), and marital difficulties (8.4%). 1
Fifth, the MBA contends that the suitability standard is not
appropriate for the mortgage lending industry in terms of policy
imperatives or business models.36 Moreover, the MBA argues that
the suitability standard is not necessarily working well even in the
securities context.37 The suitability rules of the NASD are founded
in principles of fraud prevention where a showing of scienter - or
intentional knowing or reckless conduct by a market professional -

30. Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 100-121
(2007).
31. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2000); see also
Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (2007).
32. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2000); see also
Regulation BB, 12 C.F.R. § 228 (2007). The CRA only applies to bank and savings
banks lenders.
33. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 18, at 22.
34. See, KAREN M. PENCE, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYSTEM,
FORECLOSING ON OPPORTUNITY: STATE LAWS AND MORTGAGE CREDIT 1 (2003),

available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2003/200316/200316pap.pdf
(stating that when loans go into foreclosure significant money is lost by lenders
estimated to range from thirty to sixty percent of the outstanding loan balance when
considering legal fees, foregone interest and property expenses).
35. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 18, at 24 (citing a Freddie Mac
study from 1999-2005 based on a sample of loans from its Workout Prospector
database).
36. See id. at 28-31.
37. See id. at 31.
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are required for liability. 8 Suitability standards are only triggered
based upon a securities professional recommending a specific
purchase and where the broker's professional status implies a duty
of fair dealing.3 9 The securities industry lacks the federal
legislative policy imperatives of the FHA, ECOA, HMDA, and
CRA which require affirmative efforts to expand credit
availability.4 ° Order taking, to which the NASD suitability rule
does not apply, is more descriptive of what happens in the
mortgage industry when borrowers decide whether to borrow and
their specific loan requirements. "If a mortgage lender had a
requirement to assess suitability of the loans to a borrower, it
would be as though, in the securities context, the suitability of the
security for the buyer were determined not by the buyer's brokerdealer, but rather by the seller's broker, foisting a fiduciary duty
upon the wrong party on the other side of the transaction. ,41
Finally, the vagueness of the suitability standard in the
securities industry has led to investor claims which are often driven
by general stock market declines. 42 In 1998 for example, the
NASD expressed concern when ninety-five percent of filings
under members' errors and omissions policies were fueled by
unsuitability claims.43

Mortgage lenders similarly fear an on-

slaught of litigation if a suitability standard is imposed, especially
in the current depressed housing market. As the alternative to a
suitability standard, mortgage industry lenders suggest improved
financial literacy, licensing of brokers, revised and simplified
disclosure requirements, and a uniform federal law governing
lending abuses which utilizes clear and objective standards.

38. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities
Transactions,54 Bus. LAW. 1557, 1587-88 (1999); MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra
note 18, at 27 (citing Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir.
1993); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989);
Bloor v. Carro, Spanback, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985)).
39. See Kahn v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J.
concurring).
40. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 18, at 28.
41. Id. at 30 (third emphasis added).
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. (citing Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 38, at 1557).
44. See id. at 33.
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STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

State Legislative Initiatives

Various states have recently passed legislation which
incorporates some aspect of a suitability test in the context of
mortgage lending. Other states have considered, or are still
considering, similar laws adopting suitability concepts. Remaining
in a lead role with respect to predatory lending vigilance, North
Carolina modified its 1999 predatory lending law in August 2007
to add certain restrictions for designated high-cost home loans,45
defined as "rate spread home loans." The annual percentage rate
(APR) on these loans must be in excess of two different trigger
46
points. Effective January 1, 2008, the new law adopts a variant of
suitability standard requiring lenders of "rate spread" loans to
determine whether the borrower "has the ability to repay the loan
according to its terms and to pay applicable real estate taxes and
hazard insurance premiums. 4 7 In making the required determination of a borrower's ability to repay, lenders making ratespread loans must consider the borrower's: (1) credit history; (2)
current and expected income; (3) current obligations; (4)
employment status; and (5) "financial resources other than the
obligor's equity in the property that secures repayment of the"
loan.48 If the loan has an adjustable rate, then the lender must
consider the borrower's ability to repay at the fully indexed rate.49
Rate spread lenders in North Carolina are also specifically
obligated to take reasonable steps to verify the borrower's ability
to repay by considering tax returns, bank statements, payroll
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2007).
46. See id. § 24-1.1F(a)(7)(a)-(a)(7)(b). Rate spread home loans are defined by
two triggers: whether the difference between the APR of "the loan and the yield on
U.S. Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity is" greater than or
equal to three percent on first lien loans and five percent on second loans as
compared to yields on U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturity (similar to
HOEPA triggers), and whether, when comparing the APR of the loan to the
"conventional mortgage rate" of the Federal Reserve Board, the difference is greater
than or equal to 1.75 percent for first lien loans and 3.75 percent for second lien
loans. Id.
47. Id. § 24-1.1F(c).
48. Id. § 24-1.1F(c)(1).
49. See id. § 24-1.1F(c)(3).
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receipts, and other similarly reliable documents, which effectively
eliminates no-documentation and low-documentation loans if they
are high cost. 0 North Carolina's law, however, does not mandate
escrows for taxes and insurance. 1 Mortgage brokers handling rate
spread loans are not designated as fiduciaries, but they must
disclose to borrowers any reasonably accessible "material
information" that might influence the borrower's decision whether
to proceed with the loan, 2 including the total compensation that
the broker expects to receive from each potential loan product
option which forces disclosure of yield spread premiums,
commissions, and fees. North Carolina deleted from the final
version of its law a previous duty on brokers to "provide applicants
to whom credit has been denied opportunities to correct or explain
adverse or inadequate information, or to provide additional
information."53
Other states have also recently enacted laws which include
some form of a suitability concept. In 2007, Minnesota enacted
legislation which covers all loans (not just high-cost loans) which
requires that lenders verify a borrower's ability to pay the
principal, interest, real estate taxes, insurance premiums, and the
mortgage insurance premiums.54 For adjustable rate mortgages,
Minnesota requires analysis of the borrower's ability to repay at
the fully-indexed rate.55 The statute specifically creates an "agency
relationship" between mortgage brokers and borrowers. 56
A recently enacted statute in Maine applies only to highcost loans and imposes upon lenders the suitability concept that
they reasonably believe the borrower is able to make the
scheduled payments on the loan after considering and verifying the
borrower's employment status, income, obligations, credit history,
50. See id. § 24-1.1F(c)(2).
51. See, e.g., id. (mandating that lender verify the borrower's ability to pay,
including their ability to pay related taxes and insurance, but not requiring escrows
for taxes and insurance).
52. N.C. GEN STAT. § 53-243.10(5) (2008).
53. H.R. 1817, 2007 Sess. sec. 7, § 53.243.10(10) (N.C. 2007), available at http://
www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2007/Bills/House/PDF/H1817v5.pdf.
54. Act of Apr. 20, 2007, sec. 2, § 58.13(1)(a)(23), 2007 Minn. Sess. Laws Ch. 18
(West).
55. See id.
56. Id. at sec. 6, § 58.161(1).
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and other relevant factors.57
Illinois passed its own form of a mortgage broker predatory
lending bill in November 2007.
Senate Bill 116758 requires
mortgage brokers to make sure that the proposed loan best meets
the financial needs of the borrower, 59 and also to verify that the
borrower can afford the various costs of a mortgage loan. 60 Full
disclosure is required to the borrower by the broker including the
broker's total compensation for various loan proposals.61 If the
broker presents the borrowers with different loan deals, then the
broker must make an apples-to-apples comparison on monthly
payments.62 Enforcement of the new law is left to the state
63
Attorney General under the Illinois Consumer Fraud statute.
The law goes into effect June 1, 2008.64
Many other states, especially those hard-hit with
foreclosures, are considering legislation which includes suitability
concepts applied to mortgage brokers or lenders. 6 For example,
recently enacted legislation in Colorado, among other reforms,
establishes loan product suitability standards and a quasi-fiduciary
responsibility for mortgage brokers.66
Mortgage suitability legislation has been rejected, however,
in some states. For instance, in 2006 Ohio considered, but
ultimately rejected, a proposal to impose fiduciary duties on
mortgage brokers and also on lenders in certain situations. 67 The
proposed fiduciary duties would have applied to all mortgage
brokers, loan officers, 68 and also to employees of non-bank
57. See An Act to Prevent Maine Homeowners from Predatory Lending, sec. A20, § 8-206-D(1)(G)(1)-(2), 2007 Me. Laws Ch. 273.
58. S. 1167, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007).
59. See Act of Nov. 2,2007, § 5-7(a), (a)(1), 2007 Ill. Laws 691.
60. See id. § 5-6(a).
61. See id. § 5-7(a)(1).
62. See id. § 5-10.
63. Id. § 4-15.
64. Illinois General Assembly, Bill Status for S.B.1167, Actions, http://www.
ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1167&GAID=9&DocTypelD=SB&LegI
D=29250&SessionlD=51#actions (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
65. See, e.g., H.R. 07-1322, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007); S. 07-203, 2007
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
66. See H.R. 07-1322, sec. 3, § 12-61-904.5.
67. See, e.g., S. 185,126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 1322.081 (Ohio 2006).

68. See id.
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mortgage lending companies when: (1) the transaction does not
involve a mortgage broker, and (2) the borrower has less than
$25,000 in total net assets (defined as excluding consideration of
the equity in the home, social security, pension values and life
insurance policies).69
B.

FederalProposed Legislation Includes Suitability Standards

Federal mortgage reform legislation might include some
variation of suitability standards, but it is too early to tell what any
final legislation will require. In November 2007, H.R. 3915, the
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007,
passed the House. 70 This bill requires that a lender determine in
good faith that a consumer has the ability to repay his mortgage, at
its fully-indexed rate if the mortgage is a variable rate product, and
that any refinancing transaction provide a net tangible benefit to
the borrower. 7 ' The House Bill closely tracks the suitability
concepts incorporated into the North Carolina law. Perhaps not
coincidentally, North Carolina Representatives Mel Watt and
Brad Miller were sponsors of H.R. 3915.
For "qualified safe
harbor mortgages,"" a rebuttable presumption is established as to
69. Id. § 1349.41(B).
70. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 3915: Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-3915.
71. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915,
110th Cong. sec. 201, § 129B(a)(1), (a)(3)-(a)(5) (2007); id. at sec. 202, § 129B(b)(1)(b)(3).
72. Id. at sec. 203, § 129B(c)(3)(C)(i)-(c)(3)(C)(v)(III). A qualified safe harbor
mortgage is defined as:
any residential mortgage loan--(i) for which the income and
financial resources of the consumer are verified and documented;
(ii) for which the residential mortgage loan underwriting process is
based on the fully-indexed rate, and takes into account all
applicable taxes, insurance, and assessments; (iii) which does not
provide for a repayment schedule that results in negative
amortization at any time; meets such other requirements as may be
established by regulation; and (v) for which any of the following
factors apply with respect to such loan: (I) The periodic payment
amount for principal and interest are fixed for a minimum of 5
years under the terms of the loan. (II) In the case of a variable
rate loan, the annual percentage rate varies based on a margin that
is less than 3 percent over a single generally accepted interest rate
index that is the basis for determining the rate of interest for the
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suitability.73 The House bill does not make mortgage brokers or
lenders fiduciaries of borrowers and does not set an objective test
for suitability such as a specific debt to income ratio cap at fortyfive to fifty percent.
In December 2007, Senate Banking Committee Chairman
Chris Dodd (D-CT) introduced S. 2452, the Homeownership
Preservation and Protection Act (HPPA),74 which amends the
Truth in Lending Act. HPPA would apply to high-cost loans and
defines "subprime mortgage loans" according to the HMDA
triggers and "nontraditional mortgage loans" as interest-only or
payment option ARMs. 75 HPPA includes in the loan suitability
standard the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. The bill
requires the lender to consider the borrower's: (1) income; (2)
credit history; (3) debt-to-income ratio; (4) employment status; (5)
residual income; and (6) other financial resources. 7676 If a
borrower's debt-to-income ratio is greater than forty-five percent,
then a mortgage is assumed to be unaffordable, unless the
originator can show, at a minimum, sufficient residual income to
afford the loan.7
HPPA expressly creates a fiduciary duty for mortgage
brokers in their relationship with borrowers. 7 HPPA also specifies
that all mortgages - not just subprime or non-traditional - have
certain protections, including a duty on lenders and brokers of
good faith and fair dealing when working with borrowers in the
execution of all mortgage contracts.7 ' Loan originators have the

mortgage. (III) The loan does not cause the consumer's total
monthly debts, including amounts under the loan, to exceed a
percentage established by regulation of his or her monthly gross

income or such other maximum percentage of such income as may
be prescribed by regulation under paragraph (6).
Id.
73. Id. at sec. 203, § 129B(c)(1)-(c)(2).
74. Home Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007, S. 2452, 110th

Cong. (2007).
75. See id. at sec. 101, § 103(cc)(4), (5).

76. Id. at sec. 201, § 129A(a)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).
77. See id. at sec. 201, § 129A(a)(3)(A)-(B).
78. Id. at sec. 301, § 129B(b).
79. Id. at sec. 301, § 129B(a)(4).
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duty to make reasonable efforts to make advantageous loans to
borrowers in relation to the borrower's financial circumstances.80
C.

FederalRegulatory Interagency Guidance Rejects
Endorsement of Suitability

The primary federal regulators of the banking system have
recently declined to either endorse the appropriateness of a
suitability standard as applied to mortgage lending, or to specify
the criteria for such a concept. In June 2007, the federal bank
regulatory agencies - the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve System (FRS), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA) - issued final guidance on subprime mortgage lending
(Interagency Guidance)."1
The Interagency Guidance provides direction for banks,
savings associations, and credit unions, and their subsidiaries,
holding companies, and non-bank subsidiaries covering such areas
as risk management practices, workout arrangements, consumer
protection principles, control systems, and supervisory reviews.
The subprime mortgage guidance has caused those in the industry
some concern that it will be used by plaintiffs' lawyers to form the
basis for a standard of care for alleging the unsuitability of loans.
The Agencies have tried to dispel the notion that the Interagency
Guidance establishes a suitability requirement by the following
statement:
The Agencies disagree with the commenters who
expressed concern that the proposed statement
appears to establish a suitability standard under
which lenders would be required to assist borrowers
in choosing products that are appropriate to their
These commenters
needs and circumstances.
in a position to
not
are
argued that lenders
80. S. 2452, sec. 301, § 129B(a)(5).
81. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 10,
2007).
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determine which products are most suitable for
borrowers, and that the decision should be left to
borrowers themselves. It is not the Agencies' intent
to impose such a standard, nor is there any language
in the Statement that does so.82
Despite this declaration, plaintiffs' lawyers will likely use the
Interagency Guidance to argue for suitability principles.
Ultimately, Congress could mandate the Agencies, or specific
federal regulators, to develop some standards for a suitability test
applicable to mortgage lending in general or to subprime or high
cost loans in particular.
V. LAWSUITS SEEKING IMPOSITION OF SUITABILITY TESTS TO
MORTGAGE LENDERS/BROKERS

In the face of little historical precedent for the imposition
of suitability duties on mortgage originators, but emboldened by
state legislative initiatives, in 2007 plaintiffs have filed numerous
lawsuits which seek the judicial adoption of suitability tests.
Several example cases are highlighted below. Two of the cases
below have reached resolution, with the plaintiff borrower
recovering in one case, Leff v. Equihome Mortgage Corp., and the
defendant lenders winning a dismissal in Green v. Beazer Home
Corp. The remaining cases described in this section have yet to be
resolved and demonstrate the variety of theories advanced by
plaintiffs.
A.

Recovery for Plaintiffs: Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp.

In May 2007, a federal jury awarded $220,000 to an 82-yearold borrower who sued a mortgage company for actions that the
borrower claimed violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.83
The borrower alleged that the mortgage company, EquiHome,
engaged in an unconscionable business practice in violation of the
82. Id. at 37,572.
83. See Left v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. (Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage
Corp.), No. 05-3648 (GEB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65094, at *2-4 (D. N.J. Sept. 4,
2007).
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New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by soliciting a mortgage that was
not suitable for him.8 The borrower argued that EquiHome
representatives convinced him to refinance his non-recourse
reverse mortgage with no monthly payments, a credit line of
$76,000, and no risk of foreclosure. 8 The loan product sold to him
was a $223,000, thirty-year conventional fixed-rate mortgage with
monthly payments of $1,300 and a cash pay-out of $52,000.86 The
plaintiff, whose primary income source was $940 per month from
Social Security,87 defaulted on the loan within one year of its
closing. Prior to trial, the defendants removed the case to federal
court in New Jersey.8 A jury found that EquiHome's conduct in
soliciting the loan violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
and entered a verdict in the plaintiff's favor which was
automatically trebled under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act. 89 The final judgment, entered on July 16, 2007, awarded the
plaintiff $111,075 in attorney's fees, $9,712 in costs and trebled
compensatory damages of $660,000, totaling $780,787. 90 Although
no opinion was published discussing the application of a suitability
standard, it is likely that future plaintiffs will argue unsuitability
concepts under state law unfair and deceptive acts and practices
statutes.
B.

Dismissed on Lenders' Motion: Green v. Beazer Homes
Corp.

In April 2007, a Columbia, South Carolina homeowner
filed in federal district court in South Carolina a putative class
action against homebuilder Beazer Homes and Beazer Homes

84. See Civil Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 28, Leff v. First Horizon
Home Loan Corp. (Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp.), No. L 283-05 (N.J. Super.
Ct. filed June 6, 2007).
85. See id. at 3-4.
86. See id. at 42.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Notice of Removal at 1-2, Left v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. (Leff v.
EquiHome Mortgage Corp.), No. 05-3648 (MLC) (D. N.J. 2007).
89. Leff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65094, at 4, 4 n.1.
90. Final Judgment at 1-2, Leff v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. (Leff v.
EquiHome Mortgage Corp.), No. 05-3648 (GEB-TJB) (D. S.C. 2007).
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Mortgage in Green v. Beazer Homes Corp.91 The complaint sought
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages against Beazer
Homes for conspiring to sell homes to "unqualified low-income
purchasers" who obtained financing from Beazer Home
Mortgage." The plaintiff claimed that Beazer's actions caused an
excessive number of foreclosures that led to "abnormal
depreciation" of property values in plaintiff's neighborhood
subdivision.93 According to the plaintiff, the builder and mortgage
company owed the putative class members a duty to sell houses to
persons in their neighborhoods who could make timely mortgage
payments. 94 Beazer moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing
and for failure to state a claim.95 The case was dismissed on
September 10, 2007 and was not appealed.96 The court ultimately
found that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not allege
that she had sustained any injury and could not show that the
defendants' alleged actions caused anything more than collateral
injury. 97 The court also dismissed plaintiff's negligence, civil
conspiracy, and RICO claims for failure to state a claim. 98 In
dismissing the negligence claim, the court held that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants was too
attenuated to establish a duty of care. 99
C.

Pending Litigation
1) Hennessy v. Dawson

This case, filed on behalf of forty putative class
representatives in the New York Supreme Court, alleges that the
lenders named as defendants engaged in predatory lending by
91.
2007).
92.
66887,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Complaint at 5, Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., CV-No.07-01093 (D. S.C.
Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-1098-CMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at *2-3 (D. S.C. Sept. 10, 2007).
Complaint, supra note 91, at 2.
Id. at 7.
See Green, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66887, at *1-2.
See id. at *10.
See id. at *7.
See id. at *8-10.
Id. at *9.
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making mortgage loans which were "unsuitable" for plaintiffs.'1°
The twenty-five named defendants include lenders such as Invest
Financial Corp., PHH Mortgage Corp., Countrywide Home Loans,
Homecomings Financial, Washington Mutual, and IndyMac
Bank.'01 The complaint also seeks a preliminary injunction
preventing the foreclosure of plaintiffs' loans, and relies upon a
forecast of expert testimony that the approved loans were
"unsuitable and that there were . . . warning signs of potential
fraud at their closings."' 2 The court has not ruled on plaintiffs'
injunction request.
The Hennessy plaintiffs allege that the main defendant,
Peter J. Dawson, orchestrated a "Ponzi" scheme that solicited
elderly clients to take out mortgage loans on their largely paid-for
homes in order to fund supposed high-return investments.0 3
Dawson allegedly deposited the mortgage loan proceeds into his
"disbursement account" and paid the plaintiffs' mortgage
payments for a short period of time.' 4 Dawson allegedly stole
funds from the plaintiffs' mortgage loans for himself, using new
customers' money to fund payments on prior customers' loans.' 5
Plaintiffs also sued their lenders, alleging that their loans
were oppressive and unconscionable, and contending that the
closing attorney should not have closed such suspect loans.'O The
pleadings suggest a three-part test for "unsuitability.' 0 17 A loan
may be unsuitable for a borrower who lacks the: (1) income; (2)
ability; or (3) willingness to repay the loan at issue.' The elderly
and retired plaintiffs claim that their loans were unsuitable
because they lacked sufficient income or ability to repay, and that
100. Affirmation in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4,

Hennessy v. Dawson, No. 06-019368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter
Preliminary Injunction Motion]. This section, Part V.C.1, is excerpted from an article
by the author and Matthew P. McGuire. See Matthew P. McGuire & Frank A.
Hirsch Jr., Subprime 'Suitability' Case Rides Crest of Litigation Wave, CONSUMER
FIN. SERVICES L. REP., May 2, 2007, at 3-4.

101. See id. at 1.
102. Id. at 3.

103. See id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. See id.

106. See Preliminary Injunction Motion, supra note 100, at 2, 12.
107. See id. at 9-10.
108. See id.
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the lenders did not engage in sufficient due diligence to qualify
them plaintiffs for their loans.' 9
2) Tingly v. Beazer Homes Corp.
In Tingly v. Beazer Homes Corp., the plaintiffs filed a
putative class action in North Carolina state court in March 2007.10
The defined class consisted of "[a]ll North Carolina residents who
purchased homes in subdivisions in North Carolina containing
homes constructed by Beazer where the foreclosure rate for the
subdivision [was] significantly higher than the statewide
average..1. The plaintiffs alleged that Beazer Homes built
subdivisions with home prices accessible to low income individuals
and then, through a "scheme" with Beazer Mortgage, targeted
renters in apartment complexes near the subdivisions."
The
complaint alleged that Beazer Homes and Beazer Mortgage
"advise[d] or encouraged the prospective" low income buyers to
falsify information on mortgage loan applications." 3
The plaintiffs' suitability argument accused Beazer of
liability for borrowers' obligations for mortgage payments on loans
for which they never would have qualified but for the defendants'
"scheme" to "target and victimize" low income individuals. 4 The
resulting higher-than-average rate of foreclosures in these
subdivisions and ensuing property value decreases were alleged to
be the fault of Beazer and a violation of North Carolina's unfair
and deceptive trade practices statute, which provides for treble
damages, attorneys fees, and costs."'
3) City of Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank
In January 2008, the City of Cleveland filed suit in Ohio
109. See id.

110. Class Action Complaint, Tingly v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 07-CVS-5916
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2007).
111. Id. at3.
112. Id. at 4-5.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 5-6; see also N.C. GEN.STAT.§ 75-16, 16.1 (2007).
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state court against twenty-one lenders for routinely making
"money available to unqualified borrowers who had no realistic
means of keeping up with their loan payments over the long term"
which allegedly caused foreclosures and consequential harm to
Cleveland.11 6 The city asserts one claim for common-law nuisance
against almost every major securitizer of mortgage loans made in
The complaint seeks
Ohio between the 2003 and 2007.
compensatory damages in an unspecified amount from the lenders
"for their respective roles in proliferating toxic sub-prime
mortgages" causing Cleveland to incur costs for monitoring,
maintaining, and demolishing foreclosed properties as well as
decreased tax revenues. "7 While the City of Cleveland lawsuit
does not facially attempt an unsuitability claim, it clearly is based
upon factual allegations of multiple lenders making unaffordable
loans to borrowers thus causing inevitable foreclosures.
4) AG Lawsuit Challenge:Massachusetts v. Fremont
On October 16, 2007, Martha Coakley, as Attorney
General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, filed the first
lawsuit based on the state's Predatory Home Practices Act of 2004
against Fremont General Corp. d/b/a Fremont Investment and
Loan.118 The lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court for Suffolk
County and alleges Fremont engaged in unfair and deceptive
lending to Massachusetts borrowers.'19 Among other specific
allegations, the lawsuit charged Fremont with making unsuitable
loans which were "exceedingly risky" and "would foreseeably
fail."'1 20 Fremont ceased making residential mortgage loans in
Massachusetts in March 2007 under the terms of the cease and
116. Complaint at 4, City of Cleveland v. Deutsch Bank Trust Co., No. CV 08
646970 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 10, 2008), availableat http://ohiopracticalbuslaw.files.
The complaint
wordpress.com/2008/01/cleveland-foreclosuredocumentl-11-08.pdf.
alleges that the Defendants "explicitly countenanced loans made to borrowers either
on financially irrational terms or without any information to corroborate the
borrowers' wherewithal to pay." Id. at 6-7.
117. Id. at 26-27.
118. See Complaint, Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-F
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 16,2007).
119. See id. at 1.
120. Id. at 14.
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desist order settlement with the FDIC, 1 ' but still services many of
Fremont issued a statement that it
the loans previously made.
"believes the lawsuit is without merit and will defend itself
vigorously.,

123

The lawsuit was removed by Fremont, but then

remanded back to state court, and it is in the early discovery phase
and is expected to continue.
V. CONCLUSION

As the old adage goes: bad facts make bad law. The
subprime mortgage market meltdown of 2007 and 2008 and the
egregious conduct that gave rise to it have caused legislatures,
regulators, and judges to seek a quick fix to a complex situation.
Unintended consequences often result from such a rush to action.
The potential application of some variant of a suitability standard
will be explored in congressional debate over H.R. 3915 and
Dodd's Senate Bill 2452.
Consider the possible results of this debate. If a fiduciary
duty is imposed on brokers and lenders for all mortgage
transactions, it would be a landscape-altering event at odds with
substantial judicial precedent that the borrower-creditor
relationship is at arms-length. If a fiduciary duty is imposed on
brokers and lenders only for certain subprime or high-cost loans
(e.g., using HOEPA or HMDA points and fees triggers), it would
be a significant event that would make such lending even higher
risk, more costly, and harder to qualify for in the future. If some
variation of a suitability concept, short of a fiduciary obligation,
such as a duty to determine a borrower's ability to repay using
objective factors such as a DTI ratio is adopted, then the effect on
the mortgage lending market will be more sanguine.
If Congress instructs federal regulators to develop objective
facts and relevant data around a suitability standard, then another
scenario unfolds. Because there is no clear template for a
suitability standard applied to mortgage lending, any move toward
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id.
123. Press Release, Fremont Gen. Corp., Fremont General Responds to Lawsuit
Filed by Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 1 (Oct. 5, 2007), http://media.corp
orate-ir.net/media_files/irol/10/106265/100507.pdf.
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a suitability standard will be untested. If a suitability standard has
any subjective elements, then issues of requisite intent to trigger
liability will have to be determined, perhaps by protracted
litigation. If class actions are not prohibited upon some standard,
then battles will ensue concerning this procedural claim
aggregation device.
A federal law would be deemed to preempt state law that
offers borrowers additional protections above and beyond the
federal standard unless the federal statute specifically provided a
minimum of consumer protections that could be supplemented by
additional state protections in states where the legislature has
deemed them necessary. A significant congressional battle is
likely to center on this question of whether any federal law is the
floor (to be supplemented by state law) or the ceiling (to preempt
any state law in the same arena). Multistate lenders, of course, will
prefer a uniform federal standard, while states may argue that they
have strong interests in protecting the rights of their citizens from
the actions of predatory lenders.
Of course, if Congress fails to embrace any type of
suitability standard applicable to mortgage lending, then the states
may continue to legislate their own versions of such a test.
Regulators might also prohibit certain loan products or prescribe
lending in certain situations. The predominant model for state
regulation, the North Carolina statute, stops short of a fiduciary
duty and sets the borrower's ability to repay as a suitability
standard applicable only to a certain subset of high-cost loans and
not to the entire industry.
The most serious result of adoption of a broad suitability
standard might be the rollback of positive gains made in access to
credit and homeownership for minorities. Based on market
conditions and tightened underwriting standards, mortgage loan
denial rates will undoubtedly increase. Credit denials will likely
hit minorities harder than others.' 24 The 2007 HMDA data, to be

124. See generally COMPLIANCE TECHS. & GENWORTH FIN., THE 2007 ANNUAL
MINORITY LENDING REPORT (2007), available at http://www.areaa.org/cms/2007%20
Annual%20Minority%20Lending%20Report.pdf (finding that, based upon 2006
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, in 2006, compared to 2005 levels,
mortgage lending to minorities dropped more than seven percent overall). When the
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released by March 31, 2008, and perhaps the 2008 data, will
disclose whether this harm has occurred. If it has, then mortgage
lenders will face traditional redlining challenges for inadequate
loans to protected classes. Lenders will be caught between
conflicting federal policies expressed by the ECOA, HMDA, and
CRA on the one hand and by suitability standards on the other.
The costs of credit could rise for everyone based upon lenders
having to face increased litigation expenses and liability risks.
This current subprime crisis should be kept in perspective
as a major market correction following the huge run-up in the
United States mortgage origination volume from 2001 to 2004.
Total mortgage origination volume, which historically ran at
approximately $1 trillion a year, peaked at almost $4 trillion in
2003 when, as a result of unprecedented rate cuts, homeowners
refinanced, took cash out of their home equity, and speculated that
housing prices would continue to rise indefinitely. The peak, of
course, was followed by the down cycle that began in 2006 and
continued thereafter with credit markets seizing up in the middle
of 2007. The mortgage lending market has experienced crises in
the past, such as the S&L crises of the 1980s, and survived without
major changes in basic legal principles governing the borrowercreditor relationship. This crisis should be no different in that
regard. Suitability is a dubious quick fix.

2007 HMDA data is reported this spring, a further decline in lending to minorities is
expected.

